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I’ve heard a few philosophers say that Einstein’s special theory of rela-
tivity (STR) calls for some kind of four-dimensional ontology. They say that
four-dimensional stuff is invariant in some sense that three-dimensional stuff
is not. For example, Balashov claims that “an object viewed as a 4d being
is relativistically invariant in a sense in which its 3d parts are not” (1999,
p 659).1 Similarly, Hofweber and Lange argue against Kit Fine’s fragmen-
talist interpretation of STR on the basis that “the spacetime interval, as a
frame-invariant fact, is the reality, whereas the facts related by the coordi-
nate transformations are frame-dependent facts and hence are appearances
of that reality” (2017, p 876).
In this note, I show that these philosophers are mistaken about what
is invariant in STR. In particular, there is no invariant four-dimensional
stuff in STR, neither objects nor facts. To this end, we first need a couple
definitions.
1. A 4d object is represented by a four-dimensional subset of Minkowski
spacetime. For simplicity, we will assume that a 4d object is repre-
sented (in some coordinate system) by a region of the form R×I, where
I is the unit cube. The result proven below is easily generalizable to
other regions that might represent 4d objects.
2. An object O is relativistically invariant just in case O is invariant
under Lorentz transformations.
We now show that no objects are relativistically invariant.
Theorem. For any region O of Minkowski spacetime representing a 4d ob-
ject, there is a Lorentz transformation L such that L(O) 6= O.
1Balashov’s claim was contested by Davidson (2013), who argues that 4d objects them-
selves fail to be relativistically invariant. However, Balashov (2014) and Calosi (2015)
argue that Davidson’s conclusion and the reasoning behind it are in error. We will show
here that Davidson’s conclusion, if not his reasoning, is most certainly correct.
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Proof. For simplicity, I will look at the case of two-dimensional Minkowski
spacetime, where O = R × I, and I = [0, 1] is the unit interval. The
reasoning is unchanged for the full four-dimensional case. Now choose some
particular time 0 ∈ R, and consider the 3d part {0} × I of R × I. Fix two
points p, q ∈ I such that p 6= q. For simplicity, we can take p = 〈0, 0〉 and
q = 〈0, 1〉. The action of a Lorentz boost Lv centered at p results in the x
coordinate of a point being transformed to x′ = (1− v2
c2
)−1/2x. In particular,
for the point q = 〈0, 1〉, we have x′ = (1− v2
c2
)−1/2. Hence, for large enough
v, Lv(p) lies outside the region O. That is, O is not invariant under Lorentz
transformations.
Thus, there is nothing in Minkowski spacetime that looks like a physical
object — whether three or four dimensional — and that is relativistically in-
variant. We now turn our attention to facts. Hofweber and Lang claim that
the spacetime interval is an invariant fact. But it’s not. Let’s write η(p, q)
for the spacetime distance between two points p, q of Minkowski spacetime.
Of course, the Minkowski metric η itself is invariant under Lorentz transfor-
mations. But η itself is not a fact, nor is it used to represent a fact.2 What’s
more, to say that η is Lorentz invariant means that η(p, q) = η(Lp,Lq) for
any Lorentz transformation L. But the points p and q themselves are not
invariant under Lorentz transformations, which means that it doesn’t make
sense to say that the spacetime distance between these points p and q is
invariant. The correct thing to say is that the distance between p and q is
the same as the distance between the points Lp and Lq, which are related
to the former by a Lorentz transformation. Even then, we needn’t say that
the distance between p and q is the same, in some ontological sense, as the
distance between Lp and Lq. After all, distances aren’t things.
In conclusion, arguments from invariance don’t support a four-dimensionalist
ontology for STR.
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